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Progress on NLP for mental health — indeed,
for healthcare in general — is hampered by
obstacles to shared, community-level access
to relevant data. We report on what is, to
our knowledge, the first attempt to address
this problem in mental health by conducting
a shared task using sensitive data in a secure
data enclave. Participating teams received ac-
cess to Twitter posts donated for research, in-
cluding data from users with and without sui-
cide attempts, and did all work with the dataset
entirely within a secure computational environ-
ment. We discuss the task, team results, and
lessons learned to set the stage for future tasks
on sensitive or confidential data.
1 Introduction
In natural language processing, and in AI more
generally, progress depends on data. The most sig-
nificant progress on a problem takes place when an
entire community is working on the same dataset
at the same time; for example, the wide availability
of speech recognition today is a result of decades
of research using DARPA benchmark datasets and
evaluations for speech-related tasks (Juang and Ra-
biner, 2005).
In healthcare, however, community-level activity
is an enormous challenge. Laws and regulations
related to data confidentiality create obstacles to
access, including significant administrative over-
head such as data use agreements and significant
technical overhead involving arrangements for se-
cure data distribution, storage, and management
(Lane and Schur, 2010). In mental health and par-
ticularly crisis detection, missteps like Samaritans
Radar raise highly public red flags despite well-
intentioned goals (Horvitz and Mulligan, 2015;
Resnik et al., 2021). All these legal, regulatory,
operational, and public perception risks naturally
make potential data providers skittish about data
sharing. As a result, important research in health-
care is balkanized, with community efforts scat-
tered among different datasets in ad hoc fashion as
different teams work with the data they are able to
gain access to. Or potentially it doesn’t take place
at all, as talented researchers go work on other
problems where obtaining data is just easier.
Secure data enclaves are one solution to this
problem (Lane and Schur, 2010). The key idea in a
data enclave is to bring researchers to sensitive data,
rather than disseminating data out to researchers.
A data enclave provides secure remote access to
data using carefully designed statistical, technical,
legal and operational controls. Computation on an
enclave is done using a copy of the data residing
there without full networking access, meaning that
nothing can be imported or exported without dis-
closure review. This does not replace necessary
steps like IRB approvals, data use agreements, and
record de-identification; for example, data enclave
users can still look at private data within the enclave
and need to agree not to attempt de-anonymization.
However, it drastically simplifies community-level
access. A single, comprehensive description of se-
curity provisions can be created for data providers
and ethical review boards, and data providers need
to enter into data use agreements only with the
enclave, rather than with individual teams.
To our knowledge, the CLPsych 2021 shared
task is a first-of-its-kind endeavor: as far as we
know, it is the first time a community-level shared
task with sensitive mental health data has been
conducted on a data enclave, and more generally
shared tasks on sensitive data are rare in the NLP
and machine learning communities. In addition,
although uses of data enclaves are often centered
on the use of analytics tools, in this shared task
the environment was designed to support the full
arsenal of NLP and machine learning methods. We
accomplished this by partnering with NORC at the
71
University of Chicago. Since 2006, the NORC
Data Enclave® has served U.S. state and federal
agencies, research institutes, foundations, and uni-
versities by securely housing and providing re-
mote access to confidential data. In a collaborative
project with University of Maryland, NORC has
developed the UMD/NORC Mental Health Data
Enclave (henceforth the Enclave, for short), a sub-
set of NORC Data Enclave infrastructure designed
specifically with the requirements of mental health
NLP and machine learning research in mind.
Data for this shared task were provided by Qntfy,
which runs OurDataHelps.org, an online platform
that permits donations of digital life data (includ-
ing social media) for the purposes of advancing re-
search in mental health and wellbeing. Individuals
come from a range of lived experience with men-
tal health, specifically related to this shared task:
individuals who have survived suicide attempts,
loved ones of people who have died by suicide,
and people who just want to help. For this shared
task, Qntfy established a data provider agreement
with NORC, and NORC executed data use agree-
ments with the participating teams. The University
of Maryland, College Park IRB reviewed and ap-
proved a protocol for research with, and sharing
of, the OurDataHelps data. The arrangement here
therefore exemplifies the advantages of data en-
claves discussed above. For the data provider, it
was much easier to work out an agreement with
just a single entity running an established secure
infrastructure, which significantly lowered the bar
for sharing data with multiple teams. In addition,
NORC’s platform and processes for team access,
platform security, and import/export review created
a far greater level of confidence in privacy con-
trols than sending data out to a large number of
far-flung teams with heterogeneous environments.
For teams, this provided a rare opportunity to work
with sensitive mental health data containing actual
outcomes, not proxy data as is more common in so-
cial media mental health research and which can be
problematic for a variety of reasons (Ernala et al.,
2019).
The shared task itself involved assessment of sui-
cide risk via prediction of suicide attempts, based
on the natural language of users on Twitter. There
were two subtasks: Subtask 1 involved assessing
suicide risk given 30 days of tweets prior to the
date of an attempt (or a corresponding date when
no attempt was made), and Subtask 2 involved as-
sessing suicide risk given the prior six months of
tweets.
A set of 21 teams signed up and were onboarded
on the Enclave. A total of five teams ultimately
submitted systems by the deadline. All teams have
been given several months of additional access and
support on the Enclave, in order to permit contin-
ued experimentation. We are hopeful that results
obtained during this extended time period will lead
to publications beyond CLPsych.
In this overview paper, we provide not only a
summary overview the shared task itself, in terms
of the research problem and participating teams’
findings about predicting suicide risk from Twitter
data, but also a retrospective analysis of conducting
a shared task in a secure enclave, including lessons
learned and recommendations for future tasks of
this kind.1
2 Background and Related Work
A number of recent articles discuss the use of
NLP, machine learning, and social media in service
of mental health. As important motivating back-
ground, a meta-analysis by Franklin et al. (2017)
concludes that prediction of suicidal thoughts and
behaviors has not improved in fifty years, encour-
aging a shift to algorithmic and machine learning
approaches. Schafer et al. (2021) provide signifi-
cant empirical support for this view via another
meta-analysis looking specifically at traditional
theory-driven versus machine learning approaches
to prediction of suicide risk, demonstrating that the
latter are significantly more effective at prediction.2
Naslund et al. (2020) and Lee et al. (2021) provide
overviews that include thoughtful, big-picture com-
mentary on research and clinical applications for
mental health taking advantage of NLP, machine
learning, and social media. Resnik et al. (2021) of-
fer an overview of issues more specifically focused
on using naturally occurring language as a source
of evidence in suicide prediction.
One running theme throughout discussions of
1We would be happy to discuss logistical issues, and share
details and specific language from our IRB protocol, data
provider, and data use agreements, in order to facilitate others
who would like to organize shared tasks similar to this one.
Interested readers should contact clpsych-2021-shared-task-
organizers@googlegroups.com.
2In regard to the goals of prediction versus scientific ex-
planation and understanding, it is worth noting the argument
by Yarkoni and Westfall (2017) that psychology research as
a whole, including research with explanatory goals, would
benefit by taking a predictive approach.
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this kind involves the availability of data to work
with, and the interplay, or even tension, between
the need for research and the need to respect pri-
vacy and other ethical considerations. Horvitz and
Mulligan (2015) provide one short, useful discus-
sion specifically focused on data and privacy, and
Benton et al. (2017) and Chancellor et al. (2019)
discuss ethical issues specifically with regard to
social media and work on mental health. Lane
and Schur (2010) provide a valuable entry point
to the concept of data enclaves as a way to bal-
ance the need for data access in order to make
progress in healthcare with respect for patient pri-
vacy — this concept ties in directly with the call by
Schafer et al. (2021) for community-level mental
health datasets to be easily available for research
so that the predictive ability of models can be com-
pared and research can be replicated. Those kinds
of comparisons and replications are instrumental
in modern data-driven research because without
them it is impossible to gain insight into which
approaches are most promising or to rule out the
possibility that apparent differences are related to
idiosyncratic differences in data.
Related, the most current paradigms in NLP and
machine learning involve both general-purpose pre-
training and task-specific fine-tuning. To some
extent, pre-training data may capture generaliza-
tions about language that transfer well to problems
in the mental health space. However, many off-
the-shelf language resources that are commonly
used, such as BERT (Devlin et al., 2019), are built
from sources such as books and Wikipedia entries.
These may translate poorly to systems dependent
on social media posts from Twitter, Facebook, or
an online discussion forum. It is well known that
systems perform better when they are trained on
materials similar to the materials the system will
run on (Alsentzer et al., 2019; Beltagy et al., 2019).
Therefore using task-specific data from immedi-
ately relevant sources as training data for social
media based mental health tasks is a high priority
that requires attention.
Another theme found in related literature in-
volves the nature and quality of the variables being
predicted. The sensitivity of mental health data
has led to a proliferation of proxy variables taken
from publicly available data rather than ground-
truth clinical variables or real-world outcomes (e.g.
De Choudhury and De, 2014; Coppersmith et al.,
2014; Yates et al., 2017; Shing et al., 2018; Cohan
et al., 2018; Thorstad and Wolff, 2019). As two
particularly well known and influential examples,
Coppersmith et al. (2014) infer mental health di-
agnoses of Twitter users by looking for publicly
self-reported diagnoses, and De Choudhury et al.
(2016) infer mental health progressions to suici-
dal ideation by examining when Reddit users shift
from mental health subreddits to the SuicideWatch
subreddit. Such data tend to have the advantages of
being readily accessible and large in size. However,
Ernala et al. (2019) note a variety of problems and
limitations in using proxies rather than clinically
grounded variables. Coppersmith et al. (2018) of-
fer a rare exception in this kind of work, using an
ethical process of data donation to obtain social me-
dia data with outcomes for research on prediction
of suicide attempts; our shared task is based on a
subset of their data.
3 Data
We briefly describe our data sources, and how we
constructed the shared task datasets for binary clas-
sification tasks.
3.1 Data sources
We began with data donated to the OurData-
Helps.org platform, discussed in greater detail by
Coppersmith et al. (2018). Donations to the plat-
form include data from people who have survived
a suicide attempt, data from people who died by
suicide that has been donated by loved ones, and
data donated by people who have not attempted sui-
cide but want to help. When donations take place,
a questionnaire is filled out that collects basic de-
mographic data and mental health history. This
includes the number of past suicide attempts and
dates associated with them, although dates are not
provided in all cases.
Although the platform permits collection of a
wide range of data, including, for example, social
media, fitness, and wearable data, in this shared
task we restricted our attention to Twitter data and a
subset of basic information from the questionnaire.
Only publicly available tweets are used, typically
visible to friends and family, and these were de-
identified before being provided to the Enclave.
On the Enclave, participants also had access to a
copy of the UMD Reddit Suicidality Dataset (Shing
et al., 2018; Zirikly et al., 2019). This dataset was
used by one of the teams (NUSIDS) in their sub-
mission.
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In addition, a non-sensitive practice dataset us-
ing the shared task data format was provided to
participants so they could work on developing
and debugging their systems outside of the En-
clave. It was based on a modified version of the
depression-detection dataset (Wang et al.,
2019).3
3.2 Users with Suicide Attempts
In the version of the data we began with, there
are 3,631 users, 1,613 of whom attempted (and
possibly died by) suicide. From this version, we
imposed several filters. We only considered users
who had donated Twitter data and who had reported
their gender and date of birth in the questionnaire,
in order to match users with a suicide attempt to a
control user. If a user had attempted suicide, we
only included them if they had a date associated
with the attempt, a necessary restriction in order
to examine tweets in the time period leading up
to the attempt. For users with multiple attempts,
we only considered the most recent attempt having
a date. Filtering in this way left 250 users with
suicide attempts, associated dates, and data prior to
the attempt. For Subtask 1, we restricted the set to
users who had made posts in the 30 days prior to
their suicide attempt, a total of 68. For Subtask 2,
we restricted the set to users who had made Twitter
posts during the six months prior to the attempt,
which included a total of 97 users. Teams were
provided with anonymized user IDs, the date of
the most recent suicide attempt (if applicable), and
a list of the user’s de-identified tweets from the
applicable time span.
3.3 Control Users
Similar to Coppersmith et al. (2018), we included a
set of control users matched one-to-one with users
who had attempted suicide, based on having the
same gender, similar age (within 5 years), and sim-
ilar number of tweets. These criteria resemble pre-
vious matching in the 2015 CLPsych shared task
(Coppersmith et al., 2015) and in Coppersmith et al.
(2018). Age and gender are common controls in the
mental health space, and we chose to match using
a similar number of tweets so that corresponding
users in the dataset would be represented by similar
quantities of social media evidence. For each user




Subtask 1 Subtask 2
Total # of Users 114 / 22 164 / 30
Users Under 30 104 / 15 138 / 23
Table 1: The total number of users in each subtask and
the number of users under the age of 30. The numbers
in the table are given as (training set) / (test set)





Table 2: The distribution of gender across all users.
finding all users matching age and gender, then se-
lecting the user with the closest number of tweets.
Tweets taken from the control user were from the
same time frame as their match who had an attempt
in order to minimize differences in context, such as
tweets about world events.
Table 1 shows the final number of users in each
subtask and Table 2 shows the age distribution
of users. In the shared task, we saved 15% of the
users for the test set; these numbers are shown in
the table. For both subtasks, most of the users were
female between the ages of 18 to 24 and most of
the users were under the age of 30. Within the time
period, for Subtask 1, users had an average of 24
tweets per person and in Subtask 2, there were an
average of 102 tweets per person.
4 Baseline
A baseline system was provided to shared task
participants to use or build upon.4 Baseline pre-
processing includes several standard steps. First,
we removed all URLs, user mentions, and emo-
jis from the tweets. Whenever a user’s tweet in-
cludes an image, GIF, or link, the links are re-
moved. We tokenized the tweets using the Twitter-
specific Twikenizer and removed stopwords from
the tweets’ text using the default SpaCy (Honnibal
et al., 2020) stopword list.5 Last, we split hashtags
into the words they are made up of: first, we try to
split by camel-case or by underscores; if that fails,
we use a method from HashTagSplitter, attempting






The baseline classification model used logistic
regression with the default parameters from SciKit
Learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011), employing unigram
and bigram count vectors.
5 The Enclave
As discussed in the introduction, data-driven re-
search in mental health, and healthcare more gen-
erally, faces significant obstacles owing to impor-
tant concerns about privacy and data confidentiality.
Data enclaves offer a potential solution (Lane and
Schur, 2010).
NORC at the University of Chicago, an inde-
pendent, non-profit research institution, took on
the operational aspects of running this shared task
on their data enclave. Significant time was spent
working with Qntfy, who were responsible for pro-
viding the OurDataHelps data, and the shared task
organizers, to develop the data provider agreement,
data use agreements, operational policies, support-
ing infrastructure, and technical and operational
support for the organizers and shared task teams.
All aspects of the shared task on the Enclave
were run using exactly the same procedures as
for NORC’s traditional Data Enclave clients, such
as government agencies working with confiden-
tial databases. Teams that worked on the shared
task executed a data use agreement with NORC
and then were “onboarded” to the Enclave, being
provided with account logins, passwords, documen-
tation, procedures for uploading and export (both
requiring human review of the material entering or
leaving the Enclave), and contacts and procedures
for technical support.
The Enclave environment includes two main
parts. The first part is a secure virtual desktop
(using Citrix), accessed via the Data Enclave lo-
gin page through an internet browser. The second
part of the Enclave is NORC’s Mental Health Data
Enclave (MHDE) Cluster on Amazon Web Ser-
vices (AWS). From within the secure Citrix desk-
top, participants use PuTTY ssh to reach a gateway
machine on this cluster. They can run code there
or submit batch jobs using the Slurm cluster man-
agement and job scheduling system.7 The AWS
environment is configured to spin up a new instance
for the duration of the job and then spin it down
when completed, conserving compute resources to
save cost.
Crucially, the Enclave is a closed environment.
7https://slurm.schedmd.com/
Neither the secure desktop nor the AWS cluster
permit access to the Internet. It is not possible to
scp or sftp data. It is not possible to open a
socket in a program that connects externally. It
is not possible to print, print screen, or even to
copy/paste to or from the external environment.
The NORC Data Enclave’s data security model
integrates a portfolio approach with the Five Safes
framework (Ritchie, 2017) to harden the security
posture. This means that bringing materials in, such
as code, data, or other resources, requires an im-
port request process. Each request triggers a robust
review process to provide safe passage of confi-
dential micro-data and ensure imported material
does not contain any virus or code aimed at dis-
abling the capabilities or facilitating unauthorized
access. In order to set up the Enclave environment
and hopefully speed up this process for shared task
participants, it was pre-loaded with major Python
packages and tools (more than 4000 of them), the
shared task baseline code, and shared task data; see
further discussion in Section 8.
Similarly, as a data custodian for restricted data
(e.g. confidential micro-data for federal, state and
commercial clients), NORC must ensure that any
data leaving the NORC Data Enclave is safe and
free of inappropriate disclosures. This means that
there is a request-based procedure for exporting
any material from the Enclave, with formal review
criteria that include both dataset-specific criteria
and general guidelines applied globally across all
requests.
6 Submissions
Each team was permitted up to three submissions
for each subtask (30 days and 6 months). In
each subtask, the numbered submissions for each
team distinguish the “primary” submission (num-
bered 1) from additional contrastive runs (num-
bered 2 and 3). In total, we received 30 submis-
sions, with five teams providing three runs each for
both subtasks.
NUSIDS (Zagatti et al., 2021). For the shared
task, NUSIDS designed SHTM, a Self-Harm Topic
Model, which combines standard Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) with a self-harm dictionary. This
was tested using a combination of the shared task
data, along with the practice dataset and the UMD
Reddit Suicidality Dataset. In their submission to
the task, the team used a combination of an LSTM
and term feature vectors with SHTM-based fea-
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Team (Sub.) F1 F2 TPR FAR AUC
NUSIDS (1) 0.583 0.648 0.700 0.636 0.645
NUSIDS (2) 0.615 0.714 0.800 0.727 0.664
NUSIDS (3) 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.636 0.373
ScyLab (1) 0.526 0.481 0.455 0.273 0.678
ScyLab (2) 0.526 0.481 0.455 0.273 0.678
ScyLab (3) 0.421 0.385 0.364 0.364 0.636
sentimenT5 (1) 0.455 0.455 0.455 0.545 0.438
sentimenT5 (2) 0.500 0.472 0.455 0.364 0.616
sentimenT5 (3) 0.571 0.656 0.727 0.818 0.413
SoS (1) 0.286 0.278 0.273 0.636 0.264
SoS (2) 0.400 0.377 0.364 0.455 0.529
SoS (3) 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.636 0.397
UlyaLamia (1) 0.692 0.763 0.818 0.545 0.702
UlyaLamia (2) 0.522 0.536 0.545 0.545 0.409
UlyaLamia (3) 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.364 0.740
Our baseline 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.364 0.661
Table 3: Results of participating systems and our base-
line for Subtask 1 (30 days). The best result for each
metric is listed in bold.
tures. Submissions varied in the hyper-parameters
of the model (e.g., window size and number of
topics), as well as the training data.
ScyLab (Gamoran et al., 2021). The ScyLab sub-
mission used Bayesian modeling over features
grounded in domain knowledge. These features
included behavioral information learned by Twit-
ter activity, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC) (Pennebaker et al., 2015) based features
using priors from Eichstaedt et al. (2018) and other
dictionary-based approaches. The submissions
varied the distributions for the priors and hyper-
parameters (type of regression) for the logistic-
regression model.
sentimenT5 (Morales et al., 2021). SentimenT5
took different approaches in their submissions to
explore the performance of simple traditional mod-
els versus fine-tuned deep learning models. In
both Subtasks 1 and 2, they submitted results from
gradient-boosted classifiers. One used syntax fea-
tures and the other character TF-IDF features. For
Subtask 1, they also submitted results from a con-
textualized language model classifier, and, for Sub-
task 2, a voting ensemble method.
SoS (Wang et al., 2021). Team SoS introduced
the C-Attention Network, which uses latent feature
information implicitly in the embeddings. This
was compared with submissions using KNN and
SVM classifiers. Latent features included using
Doc2vec embeddings (Lau and Baldwin, 2016).
Hand-crafted features included emotion lexicons,
Team (Sub.) F1 F2 TPR FAR AUC
NUSIDS (1) 0.684 0.812 0.929 0.786 0.663
NUSIDS (2) 0.703 0.823 0.929 0.714 0.648
NUSIDS (3) 0.649 0.759 0.857 0.786 0.480
ScyLab (1) 0.769 0.704 0.667 0.067 0.809
ScyLab (2) 0.769 0.704 0.667 0.067 0.791
ScyLab (3) 0.815 0.764 0.733 0.067 0.844
sentimenT5 (1) 0.467 0.467 0.467 0.533 0.618
sentimenT5 (2) 0.516 0.526 0.533 0.533 0.591
sentimenT5 (3) 0.727 0.769 0.800 0.400 0.720
SoS (1) 0.429 0.411 0.400 0.467 0.444
SoS (2) 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.467 0.640
SoS (3) 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.600 0.502
UlyaLamia (1) 0.595 0.671 0.733 0.733 0.582
UlyaLamia (2) 0.581 0.592 0.600 0.467 0.564
UlyaLamia (3) 0.645 0.658 0.667 0.400 0.569
Our baseline 0.710 0.724 0.733 0.333 0.764
Table 4: Results of participating systems and our base-
line for Subtask 2 (6 months). The best result for each
metric is listed in bold.
part-of-speech tags, and a custom dictionary that
models various stages of suicidal behavior.
UlyaLamia (Bayram and Benhiba, 2021). In the
UlyaLamia submissions, the authors were moti-
vated by real-life applicability of their model to use
tweet-level classification. The team’s submissions
used a majority voting approach over individual
tweets. In order to pick which machine learning
method to use, the team experimented with mul-
tiple methods tuned on the training data using a
leave-one-out strategy. Their final submissions
were the top methods from the leave-one-out re-
sults.
7 Results
We evaluated each system in terms of F1, F2 (favor-
ing recall), True Positive Rate (TPR), False Alarm
(Positive) Rate (FAR), and Area Under the ROC
Curve (AUC). We use F1 score as the primary eval-
uation metric, though it is valuable to consider all
metrics for a complete view of the system perfor-
mance.
We present the results of the submissions in Ta-
bles 3 and 4. In Subtask 1, Team UlyaLamia ranked
highest in F1, F2 and TPR; however, their FAR was
higher than the baseline and in the middle of the
other team’s submissions. Team UlyaLamia was
also the only team to exceed the baseline F1 score,
with NUSIDS being the next closest team. In Sub-
task 2, Team ScyLab ranked highest in F1, FAR,
and AUC. Their strongest submission beat or met
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Figure 1: Rank comparison of the submissions for Sub-
task 1. A label of 1 indicates users with suicide at-
tempts. Ranks closer to 1 indicate a higher score (more
likely to have made a suicide attempt) given to the user.
Rows are sorted by label, then median rank.
the baseline in every metric and was notably low
in their FAR. Five submissions came close or beat
the baseline in F1 score in Subtask 2.
The methods used by teams in the shared
task had difficulties performing well in both sub-
tasks. Given shorter-term information starting
30 days prior to an attempt, tweet-specific language
(UlyaLamia) performed beste, but dictionary-based
methods (e.g., ScyLab) worked best with the
longer-term evidence (6 months prior to an at-
tempt).
To gain a better understanding of the differences
between the submissions, we plot the ranks of each
test user for both subtasks in Figures 1 and 2. From
these figures, we can see that some users easily
classified by most systems, while others were no-
tably difficult. For instance, in the last positive
(label=1) row in Figure 2 (Subtask 2), the majority
of systems were (incorrectly) very confident that
the user did not make a suicide attempt. Neverthe-
less, three submissions gave this user the highest
or second-highest likelihood. These results suggest
that an ensemble method may be beneficial for this
task.
This task is notably similar to Coppersmith et al.
(2018), who performed experimentation including
OurDataHelps.org data with similar restrictions,
matching criteria, and the same binary outcomes.
They found that a longer history of tweets led to
slightly better predictions, but, unlike our shared
Figure 2: Rank comparison of the submissions for Sub-
task 2. A label of 1 indicates users with suicide at-
tempts. Ranks closer to 1 indicate a higher score given
to the user. Rows are sorted by label, then median rank.
task, they did not find a significant increase in per-
formance between using tweets 90 to 0 days prior
to an attempt and using tweets 180 to 90 days prior.
In Coppersmith et al. (2018), the AUC score us-
ing tweets 30 days prior to an attempt is .89 and
the AUC score using tweets six months prior to an
attempt is .93.
At the same time, it is important to note that
those results are not directly comparable to the
present task, given differences in dataset size and
composition. Coppersmith et al. (2018) used more
OurDataHelps data, and this was augmented with a
dataset of users who had made publicly self-stated
suicide attempts, building on work in Coppersmith
et al. (2016). In total, Coppersmith et al. (2018)
performed their experimentation using a dataset
containing 418 users with suicide attempts, com-
pared to this task’s 97 users.
8 Enclave Lessons Learned
We solicited feedback from all registered teams
(both those who submitted results and those who
did not) regarding the shared task experience. This
discussion and our lessons learned for the future
are informed by their comments.
Onboarding. Shared tasks are bursty by nature,
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the first burst involving participants getting started.
In contrast, the ongoing operations of a data en-
clave involve a more continuous scheduling pro-
cess for new user account requests. This led to
challenges in the onboarding process. As noted
in Section 5, procedures for this shared task were
identical to the procedures used when serving orga-
nizations like government agencies, with not one
fewer i dotted, not one fewer t crossed. This meant
that teams experienced longer than expected delays
between completing their paperwork and actually
being able to begin work on the Enclave. We would
recommend more lead time in the future, leaving
significant time for account requests and also hav-
ing teams prioritize which members need access
first.
Importing code and dependencies. Similarly,
data enclaves require strict import policies and pro-
cedures; every import request is treated as though
it could contain highly confidential data, a virus, or
disabling code. Again, the bursty nature of shared
task activity created challenges. Despite our at-
tempts to anticipate and pre-load software and data
resources that were likely to be needed (informed
by an earlier survey of people engaged in CLPsych-
related work), the burst of requests as teams got
started created long delays as teams waited for their
code and software dependencies to come online.
Workarounds, such as recreating code manually,
were complicated by the inability to copy/paste
inside the environment.
Time zones. The CLPsych 2021 Shared Task re-
ceived global interest, with teams participating on
several continents. However, data enclaves rarely
provide 24/7 support. While having a diverse set
of teams work on the task is indispensable, having
support concentrated in a single U.S. time zone dis-
proportionately affected those working outside the
U.S. We anticipate that these issues could be miti-
gated in part by greater lead time (again), and also
by streamlining processes to require fewer round
trips of communication.
Slurm and Notebooks. These days, many prefer
to conduct NLP research in an interactive setting
using Jupyter Notebooks. While these were sup-
ported on the head node of the cluster, they were
not available when running jobs on compute nodes,
including those with GPU resources. This is worth
considering. While such an arrangement would
run through one’s compute budget faster (as com-
pute nodes would remain running), the interactive
benefits may be a tradeoff that teams are willing
to make, and this would also avoid batch-job over-
head for those who do not require the capabilities
offered by a scheduler like Slurm.
Connectivity and Enclave Maintenance. Like
any well supported infrastructure, the Enclave re-
quires regular maintenance and has occasional
downtime. Scheduled maintenance was easy to
plan for, but unplanned downtime can be a real
challenge in deadline-driven activities like a shared
task.
Despite these challenges, which certainly gave
rise to some frustration, a number of teams ex-
pressed gratitude for being able to work on data
that would otherwise be unavailable, and others ex-
pressed that they were pleased with the overall re-
sponsiveness and speed of the Enclave. Some also
expressed appreciation for having had ample of
compute credits for conducting their experiments.8
If there is a unifying theme in our lessons
learned, it is that the challenges we encountered are
connected almost entirely with the gap between the
typical flexibility of experimental computational
work in NLP, particularly in the compressed time
frame of a shared task, versus the more extended,
carefully centralized, step-by-step, controlled pro-
cesses that take place on a data enclave. But of
course that’s the whole point: those same care-
ful, centralized processes are the things that guard
against inappropriate use and disclosure of sensi-
tive data.
As a particular note for the future, more ad-
vance planning and communication with partici-
pants would alleviate several of these challenges,
especially onboarding and importing code and de-
pendencies. For this shared task, we chose to prior-
itize allowing participants to start working on the
task sooner, rather than requiring teams to commit
long before they would begin work and start going
through a more structured and scheduled process to
prepare the Enclave with their specific team-level
requests. We attempted to preload needed libraries
and tools onto the Enclave even before teams be-
gan to register — but we could not predict all of
the tools and resources participants would want, so
even with our efforts there was still a gap. And
although we tested the onboarding process and cod-
ing experience, any new, diverse group of people is
going to discover unanticipated issues when using
8AWS credits supporting this activity were provided by
Amazon.
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a large production environment for a new purpose.
That said, it is worth noting that a time-bounded
shared task is just one model for this type of collab-
orative work. In other domains, it is not uncommon
for community shared activity to take place over the
longer term, e.g use of the MIMIC dataset (Johnson
et al., 2016) in research on electronic health records.
A shorter-term, bursty event like a shared task may
be the wrong model when navigating between the
requirements of flexible research and the require-
ments of data privacy — many challenges would be
mitigated if participants were not all attempting to
meet the same deadline. Therefore, an alternative
paradigm to consider would involve a more gradual
intake of participants, reducing the backlogs and
avoiding bottlenecks in account creation and han-
dling of initial import requests. This would would
also allow participants to more freely work in their
own time zone, and factor in downtimes in their
schedule.
9 Conclusion
In this effort, we introduced a mental health shared
task using sensitive language data in a secure data
enclave that offered broad NLP and machine learn-
ing capabilities. Participants conducted studies on
the prediction of suicide risk based on tweets, us-
ing donated data containing actual outcomes rather
than proxy data and matching individuals who at-
tempted suicide with control users. Participants
built systems that were able to achieve high predic-
tive power (up to 0.823 F1 score), while carefully
balancing true positives and false alarms. Through
the shared task, we learned more about the chal-
lenges of conducting such a task in an enclave en-
vironment, leading to observations that will help
set the stage for future efforts of this kind.
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